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An Approach To Detect The Wormhole Attack
In Vehicular Adhoc Networks

Harbir Kaur, Sanjay Batish & Arvind Kakaria
Dept. of Comp. Science, PEC, University Of Tech, Chandigarh, India
E-mail : harbir37@gmail.com, sanjaybatish@gmail.com, & arvind_802@rediffmail.com
Abstract - In VANET there is no centralised infrastructure due to which it is vulnerable to various security attacks . One of such
attack is wormhole attack, it enables an attacker to capture packets at one location and tunnels them to another location making a
wormhole in-between the legitimate nodes of the network. In this paper we proposes a method in which we use decision packets to
detect the wormhole nodes in the network and for maintaining the integrity of the packets we compute hash value of each packet.
The source node broadcasts the decision packet to all the nodes after receiving the route reply message from the destination node
which contains the list of the route forming nodes. The decision packets from the nodes are then evaluated by the destination node
based on the hop count value. If the hop count exceeds the threshold value, it means a wormhole is formed between the nodes.

I.

VANET has become an active area of research,
standardization, and Development because it has
tremendous potential to improve vehicle and road
safety, traffic efficiency, and convenience as well as
comfort to both drivers and passengers.

INTRODUCTION

Automobile traffic is the major problem in modern
societies. Millions of hours and gallons of fuel are
wasted everyday by vehicles stuck in traffic.
Technology is at a point today in which vehicles
themselves could be used to compile and analyze traffic
conditions which would help the drivers to take smart
decisions to avoid congestions on road due to traffic
jams or accidents and drive safely and soundly.
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) can be
considered as a subset of Mobile Ad hoc Networks
(MANETs) with unique characteristics. It is a
combination of wireless, adhoc and cellular network. It
is a special type of adhoc network used to provide
communication between vehicles. It allow the vehicles
almost to connect 100 to 300 meters to each other and in
order to create a wide range network , vehicles are
connected to each other so the mobile internet is made
.Vehicles are equipped with wireless communicating
devices. They can communicate with other vehicles
within their range leading to the formation of wireless
adhoc network that can disseminate information in a
peer to peer fashion. Each communicating vehicle act
as a wireless router or node allowing vehicles within a
particular range to form a network. As cars fallout of the
range of the network and drops out other nodes or
vehicles comes into play and start communicating
creating a mobile network. A typical VANET[1]
consists of vehicles and access points along the road.
Vehicles move on the roads sharing information
between themselves and with the Internet through the
access points.

In VANET each vehicle, acting as a wireless router
or node, is equipped with sensors that are connected to
the computer that provides (1) measurements about the
vehicle itself (speed, acceleration, tire slip), (2) the
vehicle’s location with the lane,(3) the relative speed
between the vehicle and the vehicle in front. Most
importantly , an inter vehicle communication system
formed a local area network to exchange information
with other vehicles in the neighborhood to support
cooperative driving features like lane changing ,
congestion warning , rollover warning ,coupling
decoupling , inert vehicle communication etc. The
information transmitted during communication should
be safeguarded as it contains the information about the
driver’s credentials so a threat to network would be a
threat to driver’s safety.
VANET, being a wireless network, inherits all the
security threats that a wireless system has to deal with.
A security system should be developed that should
ensure that a transmission comes from trusted source
and is not tampered in route by other sources. Our
primary focus in VANET is on safety related
applications because they require stringent time
requirements as compared to non safety related
applications. Due to the adhoc nature of the network
any node can enter or leave the network at any time and
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there is no prior trust relationship between nodes which
makes it vulnerable to various types of attacks[2] like
Sybil attack, denial of service attack, forging attack
,illusion attack[3] and wormhole attack. Wormhole
attack is the most severe of these attacks as it can occur
even if no node of the network
is compromised.
Wormhole attack can occur in every scenario where
there is no centralized unit controlling all the nodes in
the network.

between neighbouring nodes and this longer distance
can be precisely measured due to the tightly
synchronised clocks. The disadvantage of this approach
is that they require either information of each node or
tight clock synchronisation between nodes and these
requirements cannot always be satisfied in VANET.

II. RELATED WORK

a) Wormhole using packet encapsulation

In [5] Safi et. Al introduces a packet leashes method
to defend against the wormhole attack. A leash[4] is any
information that is added to a packet designed to restrict
the packet’s maximum allowed transmission distance.
Leashes are designed to protect against wormholes over
a single wireless transmission; when packets are sent
over multiple hops, each transmission requires the use of
a new leash. Leashes prevent wormhole attack by
limiting the distance of the packet to be travelled in a
transmission. There are two types of leashes:
geographical leashes[5] and temporal leashes. In a
geographical packet leash each packet, upon
transmission contains a credit which contains the
location and time of the sending node and sent to the
receiving node after digitally signed by the sending
node. At the receiving end the receiving node compares
it with its own location and timestamp and determines
whether the sender is close enough to be a neighbour.
Geographical packet leashes require accurate and
verifiable location information. With temporal
leashes[6], all nodes have tightly synchronized clocks.
The sender stamps the packet with the current time, and
signs it for later authentication. The receiver compares
the time in the packet with its local clock. If the
difference exceeds some small value, determined by the
maximum transmission range of the radio in use, the
packet is discarded. Temporal packet leashes require
extremely tight global clock synchronization, making it
infeasible for many applications.

Wormhole attacks are particularly severe against
many ad-hoc and sensor network routing protocols, such
as ad-hoc on-demand routing protocols DSR [8] and
AODV [9] protocols. First, we demonstrate how a
generic wormhole attack is launched against such
routing protocols, using DSR as an example. In DSR, if
a node, say S, needs to discover a route to a destination,
say D, S floods the network with a route request packet.
Any node that hears the request packet transmission
processes the packet, adds its identity to the source
route, and rebroadcasts it. To limit the amount of
flooding through the network, each node broadcasts
only the first route request it receives and drops any
further copies of the same request. For each route
request D receives, it generates a route reply and sends it
back to S. The source S then selects the best path from
the route replies; the best path could be either the path
with the shortest number of hops or the path associated
with the first arrived reply. However, in a malicious
environment, this protocol will fail. When a malicious
node at one part of the network hears the route request
packet, it tunnels it to a second colluding party at a
distant location near the destination. The second party
then rebroadcasts the route request. The neighbors of the
second colluding party receive the route request and
drop any further legitimate requests that may arrive later
on legitimate multihop paths. The result is that the
routes between the source and the destination go
through the two colluding nodes that will be said to have
formed a wormhole between them. This prevents nodes
from discovering legitimate paths that are more than two
hops away. One way for two colluding malicious nodes
can involve themselves in a route is by simply giving
the false illusion that the route through them is the
shortest, even though they may be many hops away.
Consider Figure 1 in which nodes A and B try to
discover the shortest path between them, in the presence
of the two malicious nodes X and Y. Node A broadcasts
a route request (REQ), X gets the REQ and encapsulates
it in a packet destined to Y through the path that exists
between X and Y (U-V-W-Z). Node Y demarshalls the
packet, and rebroadcasts it again, which reaches B. Note
that due to the packet encapsulation, the hop count does

III. DIFFERENT ATTACKING MODES
Based on the launching techniques wormhole attack
is classified into two types[10].

An advantage of geographical leashes over packet
leash is that the time synchronisation can be much
looser and other advantage is that it provides nonrepudiation of nodes so an attacker can be caught if it
pretends to reside at multiple locations. . When a
legitimate node overhears the attacker claiming to be in
different locations that would only be possible if the
attacker could travel at a velocity above the maximum
node velocity, the legitimate node can use the signed
locations to convince other legitimate nodes that the
attacker is malicious.
In temporal leashes going through a wormhole means
covering a longer distance than the normal distance
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not increase during the traversal through U-V-W-Z.
Concurrently, the REQ travels from A to B through CD-E. Node B now has two routes, the first is four hops
long (A-C-D-E-B), and the second is apparently three
hops long (A-X-Y-B). Node B will choose the second
route since it appears to be the shortest while in reality it
is seven hops long. So X and Y succeed in involving
themselves in the route between A and B. Any routing
protocol that uses the metric of shortest path to choose
the best route is vulnerable to this mode of wormhole
attack. This mode of the wormhole attack is easy to
launch since the two ends of the wormhole do not need
to have any cryptographic information.

Figure : 2 Wormhole through out-of-band channel
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In order to avoid wormhole attack, the nodes
participating in the VANET communication have to be
registered in the network. Each node is provided with
the unique id which would help in maintaining the
record of each and every node participating in the
network. The authenticated users or nodes decrease the
possibility of the out-of- band channel wormhole attack
as attackers would not be able to disrupt the route. Each
packet or message sent between two nodes should be
protected using hashing algorithms which would
maintain the integrity of the packet at every node. If the
attacker modifies the value of the message and tries to
disrupt the communication then that modification results
in change of hash value which would alarm the network
against the attacker. The attacker forms the wormhole
during the route discovery phase. In order to avoid the
formation of wormhole in the route this paper proposes
a method in which after the route reply from the
destination the source has a complete list of the
intermediate nodes forming the route[11]. As we know
the complete network consists of only authenticated
users so it is difficult for the outside attacker to disrupt
the route but there is a possibility that the attacker
compromises the legitimate users and then form their
own network in between two legitimate nodes hiding
their network from the rest of the nodes.

Figure:1 Wormhole through packet encapsulation

b) Wormhole using out-of-band Channel
This mode of the wormhole attack is launched by
having an out-of-band high-bandwidth channel between
the malicious nodes[7]. This channel can be achieved,
for example, by using a long-range directional wireless
link or a direct wired link. This mode of attack is more
difficult to launch than the previous one since it needs
specialized hardware capability. Consider the scenario
depicted in Figure 2. Node A is sending a route request
to node B, nodes X and Y are malicious having an outof-band channel between them. Node X tunnels the
route request to Y, which is a legitimate neighbor of B.
Node Y broadcasts the packet to its neighbors, including
B. Node B gets two route requests — A-X-Y-B and AC-D-E-F-B.
The first route is both shorter and faster than the
second, and is thus chosen by B. This results in a
wormhole being established between X and Y on the
route between A and B.

Out-of–band channel
normal channel
In band channel
malicious node
Figure 3: wormhole attack
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As future work, we intend to implement the proposed
solution in the real environment so that the processing
delay and efficiency of the VANET can be tested.

eg .in fig 3 the malicious nodes compromises the
legitimate nodes to form their own network.
In this we propose a scheme in which we use a
special packet called decision packet .After the route has
been set up between source node and destination node,
source node got the information about all nodes in the
path from RREP packet[11]. To identify wormhole in
the path sender node creates decision packet as shown in
fig 4. which contain all nodes identity whose has been
forming route from source to destination node in
recently identified path. Each node in the network
forwards the decision packet instead of nodes which
take part in the route formation from source to
destination. The rest of neighboring nodes process the
nodes and updates the decision packet information by
incrementing the hop count of the nodes listed in packet
that are its neighbor. This would help in calculating the
distance between the nodes.
Node
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Hop count

Fig. 4 decision packet
The nodes send these packets to the destination node
and the destination node perform a check on these
packets by evaluating the hop counts and make a
decision table.
Node

next node

Hop count

Fig 5. Decision table
If the hop count exceeds the threshold value ,let it
be 5, it means a wormhole is formed between nodes.
Every node computes the hash value of the decision
packet which is verified at the next node, so there is no
chance of alteration of the hop count by the attacker. If
any attacker by somehow changes the hop count value
then it would result in change in hash value of the
packet which would result in discarding of the packet.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposes a solution for wormhole attack
in VANET. Wormhole attack is the most dangerous
attack as it can also become a cause of other attacks like
sinkhole attack as it creates a sinkhole in the network by
falsifying the route information, DOS attack as by
discarding the packet in the wormhole results in
permanent denial of service. By introducing the decision
packets the occurrence of the wormhole reduces to a
great extent. Moreover, it does not require any
additional hardware to be installed on the nodes.
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